



Statement by the Netherlands

Fourth Conference of States Parties of the Arms Trade Treaty Treaty Implementation

Thank you Mr. Chair,

The Netherlands welcomes the discussions during the meetings of the Working Group of Effective Treaty Implementation. Those fruitful discussions would not have been possible without the efforts of the Working Group Chair, the Swiss Ambassador Mrs. Dallafior, as well as the Subgroup Chairs from Australia, Ghana and Sweden.

The Netherlands aligns itself with the statement of the EU. In my national capacity I would like the following remarks.

The NL sees value in the documentation that has been made available in the annexes of the working group's chair draft report to CSP4. Guiding those who are interested in the right direction saves time, which could be spend on other valuable tasks.

With respect to the articles 6 and 7, the Netherlands appreciated the presentations of national control systems as given by Sweden and Japan. Especially the exchange of view afterwards deepens

our shared knowledge about export controls. In that respect the Netherlands hopes that more States, either States parties or not, are willing to explain their export control system. Including States that are setting up their system or have different systems as presented so far.

At the same time the Netherlands realizes that only talking about our legal systems, experiences, policies, etc. , though of great importance, is not the whole story. To further deepen our shared knowledge it is also important to explain how our systems are applied, preferably in concrete cases and have a meaningful discussion about that afterwards, respecting our different approaches and political systems. Although this might be something difficult to achieve in reality as it may contain sensitivities, we would like to invite all to further think about what would be possible in this area and in what form these discussions could take shape.

Mr. Chair,

Diversion is an important topic and should remain on the agenda of the ATT working groups. However, it is also a difficult topic, which can only be addressed properly if States have adequate measures in place *and* States are willing not only to share information about policy measures, but also to share their information of known diverters. In reality this might be difficult,

due to political sensitivity or not wanting to alarm the diverting party.

A proper risk assessment prior to the transaction is in all cases the most important measure to reduce the risk of diversion. Measures like end-use certification, post shipment controls and involving industry, are all tools that could be used to further decrease the risk of diversion. Their effectiveness depends on the type of good to be exported, type of end user, end use, resources available to the export control authorities, etc. It shows there is no one size fits all and no simple solution.

The Netherlands is of the opinion that exchange of information, not only on the policy level, but also on the operational level, is necessary to successfully combat diversion.

Therefore, publicly available data, for example field data from the iTrace project, is of great value, especially for those who export or transit small arms or light weapons.

I thank you.