Why might we consider post-delivery cooperation?

• The exporting State does not conduct a robust risk assessment before authorizing an arms transfer

• The importing State lacks adequate import oversight and control procedures

• Assurances on re-export and end use are ignored by the importing State; adherence to assurances is not monitored by the exporting State

• No response to reports of diversion or violations of assurances

• ... To strengthen cooperation & build confidence between importing & exporting States
Post-delivery cooperation in the ATT

- No explicit mention but ...
- Confidence-building measures or jointly developed and agreed programmes between exporting and importing states to mitigate risks mentioned in Articles 7(2) and 11(2)
- **Article 11.4** on appropriate measures to be taken when a diversion of transferred conventional arms has been detected
- **Article 14** on appropriate measures to enforce national laws & regulations (Art. 14)

- Calls for cooperation to effectively implement the treaty
- Encourage sharing experience and lessons learned

---

Post-delivery cooperation in the ATT framework

1. **Sharing information** on post-shipment cooperation measures in the context of efforts to tackle diversion
2. **WGETI document** on “Possible measures to prevent and address diversion” (ATT CSP4)
   - Exporting States could conduct post-delivery checks in cooperation with importing States to verify compliance with end use conditions
     - On-site visits
     - Post-shipment physical check
     - Investigate suspected violations of end use and re-transfer conditions
3. Considering post-shipment cooperation in relation to end use and end user documentation (i.e. assurances)
### UNIDIR research findings: Considerations & benefits

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Some considerations</th>
<th>Selected benefits</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Sovereignty &amp; control</td>
<td>1. Importing State record-keeping, awareness of, &amp; compliance with assurances</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. “Deliver &amp; forget” culture</td>
<td>2. Information sharing within the importing State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Reluctance to share information on diversion incidents</td>
<td>3. Build confidence between importing &amp; exporting State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. Facilitate international assistance &amp; cooperation to prevent diversion</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

... still valid considerations?

---

Dr. Paul Holtom  
Head of Conventional Arms and Ammunition Programme  
United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research  
Email: paul.holtom@un.org